Zero Hedge

Going through today’s pertinent Q&A with Bernanke, initially we focus on Fed nemesis #1, Ron Paul. First question of relevance: “Do you Mr. Bernanke think that rates were hold too low for too long?” The degree of Fed delusion is easily seen by the response: “the bottom line is nobody really knows for sure, but the evidence is quite mixed.” Obviously the bald one has never attempted to sell a home in the Inland Empire. The evidence sure would be a little less mixed in that case. But at least Bubble Ben has given a speech on it (which incidentally caused John Taylor to almost have a conniption against the stupidity of the Fed’s chairman). Yet just in case you thought the man may have at least one screw unloose in his voluminous cranial hollow, Bernanke opens his mouth and says “Even if rates were too low for too long, the magnitude of the error was not big enough to account for the huge crisis we had. I think what caused the crisis was a failure in regulation.”…..And this is the man who determines monetary policy….Only now do we find out he has never actually ever opened an Econ 101 textbook, instead opting to go straight to writing them. Luckily Ron Paul proceeds to give the Princeton “expert” a much needed lesson in monetarism, and what happens when rates are zero for far too long.

To be expected, Bernanke certainly did not appreciate being schooled in Econ 101. After Paul rips Bernanke’s face off with the Chairman’s constant excuse that regulation is the answer to everything, arguing instead that artificially low rates merely send constantly flawed price signals, Bernanke retorts “Well you need some system to set the money supply. I guess you are a gold standard supporter.” At this point Paul gives the most priceless response ever: “I am for the constitution.” (4:50 into the clip)… A flabbergasted Bernanke again proceeds to cast the blame… This time everywhere but the Fed: “Every major country in the world uses a Central bank to make some decision about the money supply.” We ask the philosophy experts among our readers to tell us just what type of fallacy this is. Ron Paul once again has a brilliant response: “Then there is no good information for the investor unfortunately.” What are you talking about Ron – there is Cramer. At least until such time as his particular regulators wake up… Which they seem to have done so today finally.

Next up, California’s Brad Sherman asks the current-former Fed Chief duo the following runner up to the most critical question of the day: “Bureaucracies hate bad headlines, they’ll often do desperate things behind the scenes to avoid that big headline from breaking. Prudential regulators are going to get bad headlines if a big institution fails, particularly under some circumstances, and if they can prevent that failure, if they can just put it off for six months, their reputations and careers can be saved. Monetary policy, just cutting the interest rate by quarter point can save a troubled institution. So how can we be sure that monetary policy is not influenced by the natural human desire of bank supervisors, to save one or two institutions, for at least long enough for them to move over to another department. How do we make sure that monetary policy does not meet the career needs of bank supervisors?” And the token bullshit response from the follicularly confused one: “I don’t think that’s a very realistic scenario.” Oh really? We think it is, and in fact we think that the probability of influence on monetary policy arising from this line of thinking is much, much greater than all that other BS we have been hearing about how an audit will make the Fed become an engine of hyperinflation, the argument that Barney Frank, Chris Dodd, Mel Watt and all the other bought and paid for Wall Street cronies are using to prevent Ron Paul’s audit the Fed initiative from ever passing. Bernanke elaborates on what one day will be an amusing case study: “I suspect the Central Bank Chairman will be around and concerned about his or her reputation when the economy has excessive inflation or whatever problem might arise from bad interest rate policy. I don’t think there is much evidence for that particular issue.” How about the issue that every reputation can be bought and paid for by someone with a big suitcase full of brand new $100 trillion bills, with a portrait of Supreme Chancellor Blankfein on the front? This is post the hyperinflation – certainly the Central Bank chairman will not be dumb enough to want to be paid in Pre-Petition money.

Yet of all questioners, Rep. Scott Garrett asks the truly most relevant questions of the day. First among them: “Are the GSE obligations sovereign debt?” Bernanke’s response: “We stand behind it, but whether it is legally sovereign debt or not, I am not equipped to tell you.” Same thing from Volcker, who adds that it is a “bad arrangement where you have this quasi private organization and the government stands behind it.” So not even the wannabe uber regulator knows how to account for an amount equal to half of the total US Federal Debt. Swell.

On Lehman Garrett asks “The Fed was there on scene, your folks were there at Lehman’s. Was the Fed aware of the Repo 105 and the accounting irregularities going on?” Bernanke answers “No – they were hidden. We are currently, for example, the principal regulator of Goldman Sachs, and we have about a dozen people on site, and another dozen who are looking at the company. We had in this case two people assigned to Lehman. And their main obligation was to make sure we get paid back our loans…. Our objective on the discount window loan was to make sure it was safe and they were safe.“

Now parse the last few sentences carefully. Not only does the Fed admit that it is and was in the Fed’s interest to delegate manpower to make sure that Goldman is fine (in an agent ratio of 6-to-1 “scouring” over Goldman’s books), but Bernanke blatantly contradicts himself when claiming the reason for the presence of the Fed’s entourage. If the Fed was indeed so focused on recouping its discount window borrowings, then how on earth did Geithner green light that Lehman would be allowed to deposit a nearly $3 billion  CDO, which contained loans by CFC, which after a cursory look Citigroup determined was “Bottom of the barrel” and “junk”? What is the basis of this dual standard – why does the Fed pretend to be concerned with safeguarding taxpayer money (with which Bernanke justifies its minimalist presence at Lehman) when it comes from the Discount Window yet is happy to collateralize “junk” paper in the Primary Dealer Credit Facility? Is whoever was in charge of the Lehman account at the FRBNY some schizophrenic (and please let it not be discovered that the person in charge was, just like in AIG’s case, again Steven Manzari)? And why does the Fed believe it has any credibility as an uber-regulator when it constantly fails a less than uber-one?

In earlier questioning by Spencer Bacchus, Bernanke answered that the only reason why the Fed had a “couple” of people in the company, was to make sure that Lehman “repaid the money lent by the Fed’s Primary Dealer Credit Facility.” Yet the Fed had lent out money, as noted above, collateralized by, well, excrement. Once again that is a truly “brilliant” overture by a wannabe regulator of all that has a dollar sign in front of it. 

Bernanke digs himself even deeper. When explaining why the FRBNY got paid back, BB says “we took collateral and we took extra large haircuts to make sure it was safe.” Oh… so now you care about getting paid back. Was it, perhaps, under the guidance of one Goldman Sachs, who may have at this point decided it was time to rid the world of the pesky Lehman Brothers that made you start enforcing legitimate collateral controls?

Then Garrett asks the key question: “In light of these reports is this something that we should be concerned about? Is activity at these other [banks such as Goldman] is that something that (a) we should be concerned about and (b) something the Fed should be concerned about and are you looking into it.” Bernanke’s retort “[the banks] are now under our consolidated supervision, so we are now paying attention to these issues.” That’s the non-answer. As to the answer of whether the Fed is looking at whether shady accounting is going on or was going on in the past, Bernanke’s version of the Fifth is as follows: “I don’t know. This report just came out this week.” In other words if Peck had not agreed to declassify Valukas’ report, if there was no pressure to put the Examiner’s report in the public domain the Fed would never have expressed any interest into just what kind of shady accounting goes on to mask the Tier 1 and Risk Based Capital of the banks under its supervision, and that leverage ratios by most of the banks it supervises are likely complete shams?

A relentless Garrett keep probing: to the NJ representative’s question whether the Fed demanded that Lehman’s regulator (whoever it may be since it was not the Fed, even though the Fed had implemented three separate liquidity stress tests, of which Lehman failed every single one) require that Lehman raise its liquidity, Bernanke once again gets an acute case of amnesia: “I don’t have the exact information that you are asking.” So once again the Fed proves that the only thing it can regulate is the bribery sinking fund at Goldman et al with direct recipient Federal Reserve governors. Everything else will just fall into place once yet more of Goldman’s competitors are done away with, and Goldman (and JPM, of course, can’t forget Fed, Jr), are left standing as the only two financial firms in the known universe. And this is the Fed that lame duck and financially supremely challenged Chris Dodd wants to put in charge of regulating everything in this country? If that really ends up happening, we are so #&$*ed… but not before Goldman funnels all of Americas’ money into its Middle-Class Irredeemable Negative Interest Rate All-market Fund SIV.

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The Daily Reckoning

Reading the mainstream papers or watching the business news, one could be forgiven for thinking Australia has completely sidestepped the continued global depression, with our miracle economy continuing to perform divine acts. But while residential property continues its irrational bubble, for many Australians, the global financial crisis was very real – ask anyone who has owned shares in Babcock & Brown, Allco, MFS and a host of other collapsed enterprises.

Not only did investors and banks lose billions as Australia’s financial engineers crashed, but hundreds of other companies, including the once venerable Rio Tinto and Australia’s oldest property trust, GPT, desperately raised fresh capital from institutions at prices which would have been unthinkable a year earlier. The pain for retail (or ‘mum and dad’ shareholders) was compounded – not only did they suffer capital losses on their holdings and their dividends drastically reduced, but they were generally unable to participate in highly discounted capital raisings (the fruits of that were shares by a select few institutions).

Last year I spent several months working on what became Pigs at the Trough: Lessons from Australia’s Decade of Corporate Greed. The book covered various examples of corporate governance failings and executive greed, providing ‘lessons’ to help shareholders avoid being caught in the next, inevitable, downturn (which, as Bill Bonner continues to suggest, could happen sooner rather than later).

The biggest story to come out of the spate of Australian collapses is that there was no real story. The bankruptcies of MFS, Allco and Babcock in particular all bore a striking resemblance. All three companies considered themselves ‘asset originators’ – that is, their business was essentially buying stuff and selling it to what was usually a captive satellite fund. Aside from the obvious issue that buying and selling assets like toll roads, coal terminals, hotel chains or Irish telecommunication companies adds no net value to society as a whole, but also, their entire business models largely consisted of charging excessive fees to captive vehicles.

The entire arrangement was made all the more sordid by the fact that the agreements between the mothership and the various satellite companies were intentionally withheld from shareholders. This was all allowed by the ASX. Perhaps coincidentally, various ASX directors also sat on boards like Babcock & Brown (Michael Sharpe) and Brisconnections (Trevor Rowe).

In terms of sheer audacity, the collapse of Babcock & Brown is difficult to top. Led by former tax lawyer Phil Green, Babcock grew from a small leasing business based in San Francisco to a diversified investment bank which at its zenith, had more than $70 billion worth of assets under management. Babcock’s share price grew like a rocket in the late 1990s – rising from $5.00 when floated in 2004 to almost $35 in mid-2007 before the credit crunch took hold.

During that time Babcock’s leading executives, like their investment banking brethren across the globe, gorged from the trough of fees. In four years as a listed entity, Babcock paid its top dozen executives almost $300 million in cash alone, along with a couple of hundred million of (ultimately worthless) shares. The cash remuneration paid was of course – not refundable. Sadly for shareholders, neither were the billions of dollars of losses racked up by the bank through foolish real estate deals and the grossly over-priced purchase of the already highly-engineered Western Australian power company, Alinta.

But it wasn’t only the financial engineers which came crashing down as the market reassessed its tolerance of risk. The high-profile fall of Eddy Groves’ ABC Learning Centers was even more remarkable given the business earned around half of its revenue directly from taxpayers. While Eddy Groves never received a large salary, his company paid more than $100 million to his brother-in-law, Frank Zullo, for untendered maintenance works at ABC’s centres. ABC also paid Austock (the broking house which was partly owned by Groves) around $50 million in investment bank fees.

ABC surprised shareholders, banks and the Singapore Government when it announced that its fabulous business model wasn’t really that fabulous. In fact, the company’s $437 million loss in 2008 dwarfed all the alleged profits that the business ever made.

Then there were the somewhat more predictable collapses – the downfalls of the agribusiness twins – Timbercorp and Great Southern Plantations. Both companies were caught holding illiquid assets as they weren’t able to refinance debt to support their Ponzi schemes.

The biggest problem from Timbercorp and Great Southern was that while their schemes timber and horticulture schemes provided a tidy tax deduction for city folk, many of the schemes didn’t actually make any money. (In 2005 Great Southern admitted in the finest of fine print deep in its Annual Report that the company was funding its schemes after the company realised the woodchips it had harvested were worth less than the costs of planting and maintaining the trees). Great Southern told shareholders the bad news a couple of months after founder and managing director, John Young, sold $30 million worth of shares.

The common link across many of collapses?

Excessive use of debt coupled with almost universally poor governance practices and a remuneration structure geared toward short-term cash bonuses. Have we learned from the mistakes? If the real estate bubble and worldwide government indebtedness is any guide, it doesn’t look like it.

Adam Schwab
for The Daily Reckoning Australia

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The Daily Reckoning

Financial Times: US Household Debt Falls for First Time Since WWII

Yes, dear reader, we have been a voice howling in the wilderness. First the wilderness around the Café des Dames in Paris’s 19th arrondissement…recently the wilderness of Bethesda, Maryland…and lately the wilderness near the Taj Mahal Hotel in old Bombay.

Reading the TIMES of India is a delight. We see that a politician has been given a colorful, over-the-table bribe…a garland made up of 50,000 thousand-rupee notes (about $1 million)…

..a headless body has been found in Kandivli…26 people were killed when their bus fell off a bridge…

..and that more than half the population defecates in public.

In fact, India is Number One in outdoor Number Two, if our dear, delicate readers know what we mean. It has 10 times as many people defecating in public as the runner up, Indonesia. The US didn’t even make the top ten.

The poor Indians. They can’t handle alcohol. Research shows that Indians suffer higher rates of heart disease if they drink. Even light drinkers face a 40% higher risk of heart trouble, according to the study. Heavy drinkers’ risk of heart problems is twice that of non- drinkers…still, well worth it, in our humble opinion…

“110,000 killed on India’s roads and railways,” says another news item.

“Is that all,” we asked a colleague. Every time we cross a road we narrowly escape death. And we’re being careful. Other pedestrians seem to ambulate in the middle of highways…beg between lanes of busy rush- hour traffic…and make daredevil dashes across chaotic intersections. It’s amazing more aren’t killed.

There’s also an item that shows how India’s civil justice system works. A landlord has finally won an eviction – thirty-three years after he went to court! The unauthorized tenant lived in the apartment for an entire generation before finally being booted out.

But wait…our beat is money. So back to the big money story…

Mainstream economists and mainstream financial media tell us that the worst is over…that the ‘recession’ has passed…and that things are getting back to normal.

Nope, we reply. Not a chance. The old economy that existed since the end of WWII is dead. No way could it recover; you can’t revive a corpse.

It was beginning to look as though we would have to eat our words: the cadaver was sitting up in bed and watching TV.

Everything was beginning to look eerily normal, after all. A year after the stock market hit bottom, it still has not resumed its downward slope. Businesses that should have gone bust are still in business. Politicians who should have been run out of town on a rail are still putting their earmarks on everything. Bankers who should now be parking cars are still making loans.

The government is still misleading… Economists are still mis- interpreting… Investors are still mis-understanding…

..it sure seems like things are back to normal!

But something important has changed. And here comes the proof from the good ol’ FT.

The FT, by the way, has the same dim economists as everyone else. While we wouldn’t trust a government employee to manage a coffee shop, the FT’s leading economist, Martin Wolf, thinks they can manage the whole world’s economy. It’s just a matter of getting the balance right, he thinks.

But beneath the surface of the flow of silly opinions and distracting noise, there is a powerful tide…an undertow that is sweeping everything out to sea. For the first time since 1946, household debt in the US is actually going down.

This is what de-leveraging is all about. The credit expansion is over. The tide has turned. Credit flowed for 61 years. Now it ebbs. No more increases in household credit. No more increases in consumer spending, over and above wage gains. No more extra sales. No more ‘growth’ at the expense of private sector debt.

It’s over.

Regards,

Bill Bonner
for The Daily Reckoning Australia

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The Daily Reckoning

Australia didn’t miss out on the first part of the Global Financial Crisis and it’s not going to miss out on the second part. The second part is coming. And it could be worse than the first. That, in a nutshell, is the message of today’s Daily Reckoning.

For proof of the first claim – that excessive leverage and too much debt cost Australian investors billion of dollars – read today’s essay “Pigs at the Trough” by guest essayist Adam Schwab. Adam’s got a new book out by the same name. And he makes a great point: Australia may not have learned much from the first round of the GFC.

But is there really going to be a round two? Well, if the first incorrect assumption was that Australia didn’t have a bad debt problem, the second assumption is probably even more dangerous. It’s more dangerous because it’s the single most unexamined assumption behind much of Australia’s economic prosperity. The assumption is that we’ll always have China.

A growing number of professional investors are betting against China. It’s true that all of these investors – short-seller Jim Chanos, our friend Dr. Marc Faber, Harvard Professor Ken Rogoff – are all talking their book to some extent. We all do that all the time. But that doesn’t invalidate our arguments.

And the argument is simple: China’s economy is the Greatest Bubble on Earth. James Rickards, the former General Counsel for the famously-failed hedge fund Long-Term Capital Management, told Bloomberg that China is in the midst of “the greatest bubble in history.” He said the Chinese central bank’s balance sheet, “resembles that of a hedge fund buying dollars and short-selling the yuan.” “As I see it, it is the greatest bubble in history with the most massive misallocation of wealth,” he told the Asset Allocation Summit Asia 2010.

Students of the Austrian School of Economics would identify with the comment. Credit bubbles – and the world has arguably been in one long once since the U.S. dollar could no longer be redeemed for gold internationally in 1971 – know that credit creates excess demand. It gives producers a false impression of the consumer appetite for goods and services. Real resources are poured into providing people with products they buy with debt-based money.

When the bubble bursts, the demand goes too. This is why Australia’s government, slavishly obeying Keynesian dogma, has tried to “bring demand forward” or “support aggregate demand”
by giving away the nation’s surplus. And once it was finished doing that, it borrowed (stole) from the future in order to support demand.

But this just perpetuates the misallocation of resources (in this case, stealing tomorrow’s savings to support today’s consumption.) In China’s case, however, the misallocation of resources is even more impressive. There is massive over-capacity in commercial real estate with millions of square meters of vacancies. Whole cities lie empty.

These cities and office buildings were made with Australian iron ore and coking coal. If China’s miracle economy (regularly achieving politically mandated 8% GDP growth to support employment) is really the world’s largest collection of misallocated resources ever, then what do you think will happen to Australia’s economy?

On the verge of another big increase in contract iron ore prices, it may seem like a strange time to ask the question. But it’s probably the most important question Australian investors could ask themselves this year. “What can I do to protect myself against a crash in China?”

The possibility may seem remote. But remember, no one in the mainstream media or economics profession warned you of the GFC either, did they? Even if you think it’s unlikely or absurd, it’s probably something you should think about a bit. We’ve thought about it and we think the best answer is to retire now.

But what does that really mean? It means you should own a lot fewer stocks. But yes, that does contradict the rosy projections for Australia’s super annuation system. Australia’s super system is projected to have nearly $5 trillion in assets by 2025 according to an article in today’s Australian.

Chris Bowen, the Minister of Financial Services, spoke by video to a conference in Brisbane. He didn’t say where all the super money would go specifically. But he did say, “This might mean greater investment in infrastructure assets, provided a stable pipeline of opportunities was available.”

Now you may want your money to go into infrastructure assets. And if you do, more power to you. After all, they are tangible assets. But you can’t put a bridge in your refrigerator. Portable tangibility – wealth you can wear, store, or trade – is the name of the game as you reduce your allocation to deflating financial assets ahead of the hyperinflation. More on that Big Crash two-step in Friday’s letter.

Dan Denning
for The Daily Reckoning Australia

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By Karl Denninger, The Market Ticker

I’m sure you all remember how clearly I have stated that I believe that mortgage origination, securities packaging and dealing was fraudulent during the housing bubble, right?

I’ve been saying it now for three years – that credit quality was flatly ignored, appraisals were intentionally rigged and borrower lies were intentionally ignored.

Well now FHLB Seattle has gone and done what no criminal prosecutor has had the balls to do – it has sued nine securities dealers.  Among them are Credit Suisse, Deutsche Bank, JP Morgan and Bank of America.  What is FHLB Seattle alleging in its suit?

“The bank’s complaints allege that the dealers made untrue or misleading statements about the characteristics of the mortgage loans underlying the securities,” according to the statement.

The dealers made false statements or omitted important information about the loans that backed the securities they sold, the bank alleged in its complaints. The bank claims the dealers failed to disclose that appraisals were biased upward on properties that secured mortgage loans, that underwriting guidelines were ignored by originators and that loan to property value ratios were exaggerated.

Yep.  Exactly what I have said for the last three years, and what should, in my opinion, had long since led to criminal charges for alleged fraudulent conduct.

This is the second such suit – as I reported earlier the same bank and the FHLB Pittsburgh bank sued Goldman, JP Morgan and Morgan Stanley last year.

The economic mess we are in will not be resolved until these securities are recognized on bank balance sheets at their true underlying value and, where appropriate, those who falsified credit quality and other information about these securities during their packaging and sale are held to account for what they have done.

Now exactly where are all these securities and at what marks are they being held in the banks across our land?

That’s a question we all deserve an answer to.

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In our previous essay we mentioned that although it was not clearly visible in the past weeks, looking at the charts with the RSI and stochastic readings in mind, silver’s historical cyclical tendencies point to a downturn. This decline could be easily triggered by a downturn on the general stock market.

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By Michael Pettis, China Financial Markets

The Chinese new year has only just started, and already trade tensions are ratcheting up. This is perhaps appropriate — astrologers tell us that the year of the Tiger is often a year of instability and conflict — and I suspect things will almost certainly get worse. The timing of various domestic political events in the US, China and Europe will make it harder than ever for any of these countries to back down before 2012 (by which time, presumably, the world will have ended anyway).

Last Thursday President Obama made a fairly strong speech in which he urged China to adopt a “more market-oriented exchange rate”. The timing of the speech was important. On April 15 the US Treasury department will release its report stating whether or not China is a “currency manipulator”, and it is hard to believe that the Treasury department is not facing some pretty stiff pressure.

China’s response to Obama’s speech was pretty rapid and pretty angry. According to an article in the Saturday issue of the Financial Times

What it means to “politicise” the currency policy wasn’t made clear, but on Sunday Premier Wen also jumped into the fray. He denied that the RMB was undervalued and, in the words of an article in Monday’s Wall Street Journal, added the following:

Wen is absolutely right. Undervaluing or depreciating a currency certainly is a form of trade protectionism, but that, I think, is exactly the point. In a world of sluggish growth and rising unemployment, everyone’s currency policies are legitimately going to be scrutinized over whether they constitute trade protection.

An article in the People’s Daily has Wen also warning that “China opposes accusations and even forceful measures that press for yuan appreciation, which will not benefit the exchange rate reform.” The claim that external pressure will never advance reforms in China is now much debated in Europe and the US, and may be less widely believed abroad than it has been in recent years.  We’ll see.

These are murky political waters into which I do not want to dip, but it is hard to escape the politics of the debate.  The same issue of the People’s Daily had another article pointing out that US debate on the currency was driven mainly by domestic considerations and that the only reason Obama brought up the subject of the RMB was to address domestic polls.

There is, as always, a certain amount of nonsense in these articles. For example the exchange rate itself affects the ratio between savings and investment, so while the first part of Zhao’s statement is more or less right — although not as a “fundamental reason” but rather as part of an accounting identity — the second part is certainly wrong and probably meaningless.  More interestingly, it seems a little weird to argue that one of the benefits that China has provided the world with its undervalued exchange rate is low consumer prices that allow countries like the US “to consume excessively”. Aside from the fact that this pretty explicitly acknowledges that the currency is undervalued, since excess consumption is exactly the problem in the US, and since Chinese per capita consumption is much less than 10% of that of the US, it seems that China should be more approving of US attempts to return the favor and allow Chinese consumers the benefit of subsidized US prices.

Everything is politicized

Still, I do think the People Daily’s article is right to say that the RMB is becoming an important domestic issue for Obama, and that it is domestic US politics that is driving much of the recent noise and the rancor. Obama’s popularity has dropped considerably, and ahead of the upcoming elections he needs to show that he is addressing fundamental economic problems. And of course it is also always easy to get votes by bashing foreigners — this is one of the many attitudes that the US and China share.

But even though the People Daily’s criticism is correct, perhaps that doesn’t change anything meaningful. The concern over the effect of the RMB on US employment may still be a perfectly valid one, and the fact that Obama is under domestic pressure to address the currency is not an especially good reason to dismiss his concerns. On the contrary. Obama has little wiggle room, and as Paul Krugman pointed out in a fiery, and probably influential, speech last Sunday, the US may hold the stronger cards in any showdown. According to the relevant article in Business Week,

Krugman elaborated further Monday in the New York Times in an article, and then in a follow up article Wednesday, both of which are likely to be much quoted and widely read. Although Premier Wen noted again in his speech Sunday that China is “worried” about the value of its US dollar reserves, perhaps as a warning that China would counteract any US trade move by selling off USG bonds, Krugman doesn’t seem especially worried about this threat.

He may be right. Aside from the fact that it is not clear how China can dump Treasury bonds, he claims that it would only help the Fed in its quantitative easing, and would probably do far more damage to Europe (since China would presumably have to buy euros) than to the US.

The latter point is almost certainly correct. China’s Selling dollars and buying something else would allow the US to get even more bang for its protectionist buck, probably at poor Europe’s expense.  I would also add that the main long-term impact of dumping USG bonds might be no more than to cause a liquidation of Chinese assets at very low prices, and an equivalent transfer of wealth from China to the US (or to others likely at some point to buy cheap dollar assets).

Remember that at the beginning of WW1 something similar happened. In an urgent attempt to raise gold reserves to pay for the war, in the late summer of 1914 European belligerents dumped onto US markets what amounted to a far greater share of US assets than China currently holds. This caused about six months of havoc, and many sleepless nights in New York and Washington. But the US responded by putting into place temporary capital and stock market controls, and when the dust settled, the net effect was one of the most massive short-term transfers of wealth ever recorded from one group of countries, the European belligerents, to another, the US.  European dumping caused a collapse in prices, and US investors ultimately scooped up the assets up very cheaply.

That doesn’t mean that there will be no cost for the US if China dumps, but rather that the cost might be absorbed fairly comfortably over a reasonable time period. I suppose I will be very unpopular for pointing this out — especially with people in the US Treasury department and among Chinese cold warriors — but please don’t blame the messenger.  I am just trying to use the limited historical precedents to figure out what is likely to happen.  We have seen asset dumping before, and on an even larger scale, and the US capital market is deep enough that it might easily absorb it.

Where I disagree with Krugman is with his claim that the chance of triggering a trade war is small. In fact, the day Krugman published his article, 130 US Congressmen sent an open letter to secretaries Timothy Geithner (Treasury) and Gary Locke (Commerce) demanding that China be designated a currency manipulator.  They called for duties to be imposed on Chinese imports to counter the effect of the undervalued RMB.  This raises pressure significantly, and I am sure in the next week or two there will be a lot more.  There are also strong rumors of some high-powered and relevant Congressional session next week.  Stay tuned.

Of course regular readers of my blog won’t be surprised by any of this.  The logic behind a prediction of trade war is almost unchallengeable, and the two countries are simply the two most visible in a world in which trade tensions must inexorably rise.  Just ask the Germans and their European partners.  Trade relationships will continue to get much worse, largely because the cost of trade war for high-deficit countries is so much lower than for high-surplus countries, and there seems to be no real attempt on either side to tone down aggressive actions or rhetoric. We seem to be caught in a downward spiral, and the longer it goes on the harder it is for anyone not to participate.

But while I think the economic effect of a tariff war on the US is likely to be smaller than many expect (and much smaller than that indicated by some of the outraged yelping I saw on a CNBC show dedicated to the subject today), and maybe even employment-positive in the short term, I do not think it is in the longer term interest of the US.  I think trade war would be very painful for China, and forcing them into such a difficult position will poison the relationship for many years.  This is likely to be the most important global relationship of the next few decades, and we really need a better way to resolve these very thorny issues, but that almost certainly isn’t going to happen.

To return to the People’s Daily article, I think many in China have argued that a revaluation of the RMB may have a significant effect on China’s trade surplus without having an equivalent effect on the US trade deficit. The same would be true of tariffs on Chinese goods.  In either case, say many in Beijing, China loses, but the US doesn’t gain, so why is the US so determined to force this outcome?

I think this claim is probably correct. An RMB revaluation in itself might not have as big an impact on the US deficit as many think. To see why, I thought I would try to outline what the impact of an RMB revaluation would be for China and the world by asking a few basic questions and coming up with my best possible answers. Here goes:

What will the balance sheet effect of an RMB revaluation be on China?

There are broadly speaking two different classes of revaluation effects, the economic effect and the balance sheet effect. By the former I just mean the impact a revaluation will have on the future development of China’s economy, and by the latter I mean the immediate balance sheet losses and gains for China. Obviously these two are related.

Let me begin with balance sheet impacts. Two weeks ago I posted a rather long entry on that very subject. For those who can’t bear reading or re-reading such a long post, the quick answer is that, contrary to common perception, a revaluation of the RMB is likely to have a very small, and probably positive, overall balance sheet impact on total Chinese wealth.

That is, however, not the end of the story. There is a significant transfer within China of wealth, which will create clear winners and losers. Basically any economic entity that is explicitly or implicitly long dollars (by which I mean any foreign currency not pegged to the RMB) and short RMB, will lose in a revaluation. Conversely, any entity that is explicitly or implicitly long RMB, and short dollars, will win. In my earlier entry I pointed out that the PBoC is the single biggest loser. It is long, if correctly counted, roughly $3 trillion in dollars, against which it is short an equivalent amount of RMB.

Exporters and manufacturers in the tradable goods sector will also lose. Their expected revenues (which can be conceptually capitalized as an asset) are mainly in dollars whereas their expected costs are partly or mainly in RMB. This means that the value of future revenues will drop relative to the value of future expenses, and so they will take a loss.

Finally in that entry I pointed out that any wealthy Chinese individual with a substantial amount of honest or ill-gotten gains stuffed in bank accounts abroad will also lose. But I forgot to mention another big group of losers — anyone in China who has stockpiled inventories of goods or commodities whose prices are set in international markets. Those prices will immediately drop in RMB terms upon a revaluation, and if the asset purchases were financed by RMB borrowing or assets, there will be a loss. So to the extent that companies or individuals are stockpiling iron, copper, chemicals, or anything similar, they will also take an immediate loss.

So who wins in a revaluation? Nearly everyone in China who has at least part of his consumption basket consisting of imported goods, which basically means every one in China except pure subsistence farmers. Because the rise in the value of the RMB causes the price of all imports automatically to fall, a revaluation increases the wealth of Chinese households by increasing the real value of their current and future assets and income.

This is the key point. A revaluation shifts wealth from the Chinese government and the manufacturing sectors (and some wealthy Chinese) to Chinese households — which, by the way, is pretty much what is meant by “rebalancing” in the Chinese context. There are many other ways besides revaluation to shift income this way. The PBoC can raise deposit rates, wages can rise faster than productivity, companies can be privatized by giving away shares to the pubic, and so on. They all have the same effect. They shift resources to households and away from producers, infrastructure investment, and real estate developers. This allows household income to grow relative to national income, which ultimately increases the consumption share of GDP.

What will the economic effect of an RMB revaluation be on China?

So as things stand currently, the reason an undervalued RMB distorts international trade is because it transfers income from Chinese households (they have to pay more for imports) and subsidizes Chinese manufacturers in the tradable goods sector. This is one of the many mechanisms by which households are forced to subsidize production and investment.

A revaluation, then, is part of the rebalancing mechanism. It helps to reduce subsidies to manufacturers and returns the income to Chinese households, who can then increase their relative consumption. But there is a cost to this rebalancing. China’s current industrial policies sacrificed household income in order to spur manufacturing growth, and this had the obvious secondary effect of speeding up employment and, with it, household income. So in a way by repressing household income growth China was paradoxically able to achieve rapid growth in household income. Neat trick, eh?

But of course this growth wasn’t unencumbered. Much Chinese growth was based on concealing the true costs behind hidden subsidies, so that real economic growth was likely to be lower than recorded economic growth. More importantly, because everything in the world must balance, the imbalances within China required the opposite imbalances outside of China — which mostly meant in the US.  Just as this global system implicitly taxed Chinese household consumption to subsidize Chinese manufacturing and employment growth, it also implicitly taxed US manufacturers in order to subsidize US consumers. American consumers got cheaper (foreign) goods, American manufacturers had to compete against lower (foreign) prices.

So Americans over-consumed and Chinese over-saved. The system worked well for quite a while, until, as with Japan in the late 1980s, US debt levels and employment rose to economically and politically unacceptable levels.

For China and the US to adjust means both of them unwinding this trade-off. Beijing will have to enact policies that reduce the subsidies to manufacturers and return the income to Chinese households. But this automatically means depressing economic growth and, more importantly, depressing employment growth.

This shouldn’t be a serious problem if it happens slowly. As Chinese manufactures gradually lose their subsidies, they will rely more than ever on the consequent rising Chinese consumption, and so domestic consumption will replace subsidized foreign demand as the source of growth. Not only will China have a safer and more balanced economy, but it will be more innovative (consumption tends to drive innovation, not production) and much more efficient.

But China cannot adjust too quickly. If Beijing removes the implicit subsidies, including those caused by the undervalued exchange rate, too rapidly, that could force large-scale bankruptcies as Chinese manufacturers found themselves unable to compete globally or at home. If these bankruptcies forced up unemployment, then paradoxically even as the transfers from households to businesses are being reversed, household income would nonetheless decline as unemployment soared. In that case Chinese manufacturers would find themselves becoming uncompetitive in international markets just as domestic markets are collapsing.

The conclusion? A rebalancing is necessary for China, as nearly everyone in the leadership knows. This will involve, among other things, a significant revaluing of the currency. But rebalancing cannot happen too quickly without risking throwing the economy into a tailspin.  That cannot and should not be a part of the US or Chinese policy objective.  By the way if China is forced to revalue the currency too quickly, it will have to enact countervailing policies — lower interest rates, suppress wages, increase credit and subsidies — to protect the economy from falling apart, and these will exacerbate other imbalances that may be even worse than the currency misalignment.  Currency revaluation, then, should be part of a broader adjustment process.

So how can the global system adjust?

If we abstract for a moment, and call all trade-deficit countries the United States, and all trade-surplus countries China, there are broadly speaking two ways the system can adjust. Remember that each domestic imbalance requires the other, so that if China adjusts, the US must adjust too, and if the US adjusts, China must adjust too.  (For those more technically inclined, by the way, this is one of the points that Krugman makes in his second article, although using different terms: China’s exporting of capital must create capital imports somewhere else, and these capital imports are the obverse of the trade deficit.)

One way in which the system can adjust is for China to take the lead and reverse the policies that cause households to transfer resources to its manufacturers. As a consequence consumption will no longer be taxed to subsidize production. This will cause household consumption to rise as share of GDP — the good way by a surge in consumption, the bad way by a collapse in economic growth.

Either way, the rebalancing in China will force an equivalent rebalancing in the US. As the price of Chinese goods rise, the net impact will be to transfer resources from US consumers, who have to pay more for their imports, to US producers (US producers become more globally competitive). The rise in Chinese consumption relative to Chinese production would be necessarily matched by a rise in US production relative to US consumption. (Some readers will notice that I am ignoring the role of investment in economic growth, and of course changes in investment matter, but over the medium to long term the basic argument is unchanged.)

The second way in which the system adjusts is if the US drives it. The US can put into place policies that favor manufacturers at the expense of consumers. These include consumption taxes, manufacturing subsidies, penalties for consumer borrowing, subsidies for investment, or, more ominously, import tariffs. These can all have the same aggregate effect on the US trade account by shifting the relationship between how much Americans produce domestically and how much they consume. And of course as the US adjusts, China must also automatically adjust.  Tariffs just on Chinese goods, by the way, will have a minimal impact on the US adjustment since trade may very well just shift to other countries.

Note that in either case both countries will rebalance, but rebalancing says nothing about how rapid economic growth must be. I addressed this in a blog entry last week when I discussed Japan’s dismal post-1990 rebalancing. In this context rebalancing just means that in China economic growth will be less than consumption growth, and in the US consumption growth will be less than economic growth. The problem is that China will try to adjust by pushing the cost of the adjustment onto the US, and the US will try to adjust by pushing the cost onto China. Each country can strive towards the good outcome (rapid economic growth) or find itself facing the bad outcome (declining consumption). This is why policy coordination and gradualism is so important.

Will a revaluation cause China’s trade surplus to decline?

Yes, all other things being equal, but of course all other things are not equal. Within China there are several things that will affect the trade surplus. Remember that the trade surplus exists because of the imbalance between Chinese domestic production and Chinese domestic consumption (technically the surplus is the difference between savings and investment), and so anything that affects the subsidies to manufacturers, or that affects household income, will also affect the trade surplus.

I have already argued that interest rates and wage growth that is lower than productivity growth can affect the trade surplus as much as the undervalued currency. In that case, if the RMB revalues, and at the same time real interest rates are forced down by a sufficient amount, or wage growth is restrained, the net result can easily be a rise, not a decline, in the trade surplus. It depends on the relative magnitude of the different factors.

The external environment also matters. If US interest rates decline for example, unlike in China where declining deposit rates is likely to spur savings, US consumption may rise even as the cost of Chinese imports rises because of a surge in the RMB.

Quite a lot of defenders of RMB stability have made the point that the rise of the yen after 1985 and the rise of the RMB after 2005 were most emphatically not associated with declining trade surpluses. According to their arguments, this clearly proves that the currency doesn’t matter.

This is nonsense, and even if it were true it seems more an argument in favor of revaluing than an argument in favor of not revaluing. But it isn’t true because in both cases there were countervailing changes.  Perhaps most importantly, local interest rates in Japan and China declined in real terms, thus reducing local consumption, and US interest rates also declined, spurring US consumption (I know, I know, this sounds strange, but the wealth effect of interest-rate changes in the US is the opposite of that in Japan and China because of the differing structures of household balance sheets). All that happened in both cases was that the rebalancing effect of the currency revaluation was swamped by the exacerbating effect of other factors. The only thing that Japan after 1985 and China after 2005 prove is that the currency is not the only thing that matters.

Will a decline in China’s trade surplus cause the US trade deficit to decline?

Not necessarily. Beijing has pointed out many times that a contraction in the Chinese trade surplus does not necessarily mean an equivalent contraction in the US trade deficit. All it requires is an equivalent contraction in the rest of the world’s net trade deficit. This could easily happen with an improvement in the trade balances of Vietnam, Mexico, Korea or anyone else, enough fully to absorb the reduction in China’s trade surplus. In that case, the US trade balance does not improve, and the US gets none of the employment benefit of the RMB revaluation. China will simply import fewer jobs from abroad and some other countries will import more, or export fewer, jobs.

Remember that if the RMB revalues, this is the same as if all the currencies of the rest of the world depreciate. This will cause a shift in the rest of the world so that households will see a small reduction in their real income, and non-Chinese producers in the tradable goods sector will see a small increase in their competitiveness vis a vis the rest of the world (largely because Chinese producers becomes less competitive). This will reduce non-Chinese consumption and increase non-Chinese production, and the distribution of these changes among different countries, including the US, will depend on a vast array of factors.

So Beijing is absolutely correct in arguing that an RMB revaluation might not have a major impact on the US trade balance, although there is one important caveat. A number of other developing countries, especially in Asia, are concerned about excessively loose domestic monetary policy and inflation, and would like to raise the values of their own currencies. They cannot do so, however, until China does. During the crisis China has expanded its share of global net demand at their expense. If an RMB revaluation causes revaluation in other countries with large trade surpluses, the net impact on the much smaller “rest of the world” will be much bigger, and so simply as a function of arithmetic the US is bound to benefit.

This fact again argues in favor of globally coordinated action rather than an excessive focus on RMB bashing. If China is forced to revalue the RMB, in order to gain the optimal global rebalancing it should be done as part of a general realignment of currencies (although of course cynics will point out that surest way to ensure that something doesn’t get done is to coordinate it globally).

Is it only China that must act?

China will rebalance, but it cannot do so quickly. If it does, as I discussed above, it may easily fall into a spiral of declining competitiveness leading to rising unemployment leading to declining domestic consumption leading to more unemployment. Clearly this is not in China’s interest.

There is another problem. There are several countries with structurally low consumption and high production — Germany, Japan and China being the most important (and I leave out the OPEC countries for obvious reasons). Simply forcing China to adjust, in that case, might cause damage to Chinese growth prospects without helping the US rebalancing effort.

For example, a sharp rise in the RMB, especially if accompanied by a rise in other Asian currencies, will take depreciation pressure off the dollar. Since currently most of that depreciation pressure is borne by the euro, a revaluation of the RMB could easily also result in a decline in the euro, whose economies will then see a sharp improvement in their net trade balance. This means that a significant part of the benefits of Chinese revaluation may accrue to Germany, a country that has yet to resolve its own internal imbalances.

So limiting the whole rebalancing discussion just to China and the RMB may end up not helping much. It is true that the US could force through a rapid domestic rebalancing of its own, including by raising import tariffs generally (and not just on Chinese goods), if it really wanted to, and the benefits to the US would be a surge in employment and manufacturing at probably little real long-term economic cost. But unilateral action on the part of the US risks creating at least some problems for the rest of the world, especially China, Japan, and parts of Europe.

So what must be done? Clearly there is a problem with the undervaluation of the RMB and with Chinese domestic imbalances. But just as clearly there are also problems with a number of other major over-consuming and over-producing countries. In addition Chinese producers have become so addicted to a wide variety of implicit subsidies, besides the currency, that they cannot possibly adjust very quickly. It will take years of continuous adjustment to wean them away from an undervalued currency, too-low interest rates, excessive credit aimed at SOEs, and sluggish wage growth.

That suggests that if we want to resolve the global imbalances in an optimal way that maximizes global growth and equity, we would need all the major problem countries to work out a program, perhaps over 8 to 10 years, in which China, Japan and Germany take concrete measures to shift subsidies away from manufacturers and return the income to households, and the US, the UK and other deficit countries shift income from households to investment.

Of course the cynic in me says getting a global solution will prove impossible. Each country that benefits in the short term from stonewalling on any aspect of the complex adjustment process will do so. So I guess that just leaves trade war. This is the year of the Tiger, after all.

More articles from China Financial Markets….

The Daily Reckoning

We’re going to rename our theory. This is more than a depression; it’s more than a financial and economic phenomenon. It includes a shift of power…a return to normal after 4 centuries of aberration…and the failure of a whole line of Nobel Prizing-winning economic claptrap, including the Efficient Market Hypothesis and Modern Portfolio Theory. Let’s call this phase “The Great Correction”…and wait for events to prove we’re right.

In the meantime…we await clarification…

When will this bounce end? What will happen when it does?

Yesterday was another inconclusive, information-free day. The Dow rose 17 points. Gold went up $5. Oil fell to $79 a barrel.

But the deep trends continue. The government grows…and heads towards bankruptcy. Most developed nations are running huge deficits in their public accounts. The one that has been most in the news is Greece. The Hellenes promised to cut their spending, rioted in the streets, and now hope for some back-up plan from Europe. The rest of the PIGS (peripheral European states, with good food and wine, but bad finances) watch carefully. What Greece gets now they’re likely to get later.

But the problem is hardly limited to the small states of Europe.

Barron’s reports that the states face “massive shortfalls” in their pension programs. This is in addition to the other massive shortfalls faced by governments all over the planet.

“US ratings threat,” is the headline on today’s Financial Times:

“Moody’s Investor Service will warn the US today that unless it gets its public finances into better shape than the Obama administration projects there would be ‘downward pressure’ on its triple A credit rating.”

Moody’s learned a lesson last year. You take money from the ratee. You give a good rating to junk. Then, people point their fingers at you and sue when the junk goes bad. The raters don’t want every Treasury bond holder in the world at their throats.

The US is going broke; no doubt about it. Of course, it may take years…

What the hell? We can wait…

Some Treasury buyers aren’t waiting until the last minute. “China continues selling US Debt in January,” comes a report from The Wall Street Journal.

Japan too, adds Bloomberg.

Japan, of course, faces a financial crisis of its own. It already has government debt greater than 200% of GDP…and its aging citizens are saving less money each year. Pretty soon, it will be unable to finance its deficits. Then what?

Then, yields will rise and Japan will face a crisis similar to that of Greece.

And what about China? Even countries with sound budgets can take huge financial hits.

“China may face massive bank bailouts,” Bloomberg reports.

Yes, dear reader…China has a solid budget…and industries that make money. The trouble is, it has too many of them. And now it’s made the mistake of stimulating them to increase production – as well as increasing infrastructure – at the worst possible moment, just as their major customer goes into a funk.

So, while China’s state finances are in good shape – at least on the surface – its private sector finances are a mess. They are such a huge potential mess that one analyst refers to China as the ‘mother of black swans.’

Who’s going to bail out China’s banking sector? Who’s going to bail out Greece? Who’s going to bail out Japan? Who’s going to bail out the US?

Day by day, the lumbering, clumbering wheels roll on…towards bigger governments with greater debts… One government looks to another one to help it out. The other looks to yet another. One nation depends on its central bank…and its central bank depends on the US Federal Reserve, the capo di tutti capi of all the world’s central banks.

Regards,

Bill Bonner
for The Daily Reckoning Australia

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