India s Agriculture Minister Sharad Pawar Thursday said prices of essential commodities including sugar were coming down.

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Zero Hedge

The next time we get a serious dip in the stock market, there is one sector that I am going to jump into with both of my size 14 boots: technology stocks. 

After the dotcom bust of 2000, these bad boys spent nearly a decade in the penalty box, shunned by the investing world as the poster boys for wild excess. Think Robert Downey, Jr. on steroids. During this time, cash balances doubled, free cash flows soared, outstanding shares shrank, and multiples fell to a tenth of their bubblicious peaks.

 I started recommending this group at the absolute bottom of the market last March (click here for the call at http://www.madhedgefundtrader.com/March_2__2009.html ), and it was no surprise to me when they outperformed almost every sector on the upside. With 60%-80% of their earnings coming from abroad, primarily Asia, I saw them really as foreign stocks wearing cowboy hats, pearl snap buttoned shirts, and Ray Ban aviator sunglasses.

They were great weak dollar plays. They did not need banks, as they are almost entirely self financed. They avoided many of the management errors that torpedoed so many other US firms, like derivatives books  and leveraged real estate exposure. While their American customers were getting poorer, hundreds of millions more overseas were getting richer.

The industry represents the last, best hope that America has for competing globally, as it is our only means of staying on top of the international value added chain. It seems that in addition to bulk commodities like corn, wheat, soybeans, coal and timber, aircraft, weapons, and movies, tech companies are among the few that make things foreigners want to buy.

The lessons of the bubble made them ultra conservative in their capital spending which will lead to product shortages and much higher prices in any recovery. Memory, for example, has seen no capex at all for three years. They are surfing the wave of innovation, and will cash in big time from the mobile computing revolution, cloud computing, and the virtualization of data centers.

During the last tech bubble, the industry did not have the global market that it does today. Now, demand from the rising emerging market middle class is kicking in, as it is for commodities. The nine month tech rally we saw in 2009 could  just be the down payment of a decade long bull market in these stocks, which will end with another bubble.

When John Chambers, a first class manager, discussed Cisco’s (CSCO) outlook after announcing blowout Q4 earnings, he was so effusive he sounded like he was on ecstasy. Take a look at Juniper Networks (JNPR), JDS Uniphase, (JDSU), Sandisk (SNDK), Micron Technology (MU), and lithography toolmaker (ASML). Long dated call spreads in all of these make sense on a decent dip.

For more iconoclastic and out of consensus analysis, you can always visit me at www.madhedgefundtrader.com , where the conventional wisdom is mercilessly flailed and tortured daily, or listen to me on Hedge Fund Radio at http://www.madhedgefundtrader.biz/ .

More articles from Zero Hedge….

By Michael Pettis, China Financial Markets

The Chinese new year has only just started, and already trade tensions are ratcheting up. This is perhaps appropriate — astrologers tell us that the year of the Tiger is often a year of instability and conflict — and I suspect things will almost certainly get worse. The timing of various domestic political events in the US, China and Europe will make it harder than ever for any of these countries to back down before 2012 (by which time, presumably, the world will have ended anyway).

Last Thursday President Obama made a fairly strong speech in which he urged China to adopt a “more market-oriented exchange rate”. The timing of the speech was important. On April 15 the US Treasury department will release its report stating whether or not China is a “currency manipulator”, and it is hard to believe that the Treasury department is not facing some pretty stiff pressure.

China’s response to Obama’s speech was pretty rapid and pretty angry. According to an article in the Saturday issue of the Financial Times

What it means to “politicise” the currency policy wasn’t made clear, but on Sunday Premier Wen also jumped into the fray. He denied that the RMB was undervalued and, in the words of an article in Monday’s Wall Street Journal, added the following:

Wen is absolutely right. Undervaluing or depreciating a currency certainly is a form of trade protectionism, but that, I think, is exactly the point. In a world of sluggish growth and rising unemployment, everyone’s currency policies are legitimately going to be scrutinized over whether they constitute trade protection.

An article in the People’s Daily has Wen also warning that “China opposes accusations and even forceful measures that press for yuan appreciation, which will not benefit the exchange rate reform.” The claim that external pressure will never advance reforms in China is now much debated in Europe and the US, and may be less widely believed abroad than it has been in recent years.  We’ll see.

These are murky political waters into which I do not want to dip, but it is hard to escape the politics of the debate.  The same issue of the People’s Daily had another article pointing out that US debate on the currency was driven mainly by domestic considerations and that the only reason Obama brought up the subject of the RMB was to address domestic polls.

There is, as always, a certain amount of nonsense in these articles. For example the exchange rate itself affects the ratio between savings and investment, so while the first part of Zhao’s statement is more or less right — although not as a “fundamental reason” but rather as part of an accounting identity — the second part is certainly wrong and probably meaningless.  More interestingly, it seems a little weird to argue that one of the benefits that China has provided the world with its undervalued exchange rate is low consumer prices that allow countries like the US “to consume excessively”. Aside from the fact that this pretty explicitly acknowledges that the currency is undervalued, since excess consumption is exactly the problem in the US, and since Chinese per capita consumption is much less than 10% of that of the US, it seems that China should be more approving of US attempts to return the favor and allow Chinese consumers the benefit of subsidized US prices.

Everything is politicized

Still, I do think the People Daily’s article is right to say that the RMB is becoming an important domestic issue for Obama, and that it is domestic US politics that is driving much of the recent noise and the rancor. Obama’s popularity has dropped considerably, and ahead of the upcoming elections he needs to show that he is addressing fundamental economic problems. And of course it is also always easy to get votes by bashing foreigners — this is one of the many attitudes that the US and China share.

But even though the People Daily’s criticism is correct, perhaps that doesn’t change anything meaningful. The concern over the effect of the RMB on US employment may still be a perfectly valid one, and the fact that Obama is under domestic pressure to address the currency is not an especially good reason to dismiss his concerns. On the contrary. Obama has little wiggle room, and as Paul Krugman pointed out in a fiery, and probably influential, speech last Sunday, the US may hold the stronger cards in any showdown. According to the relevant article in Business Week,

Krugman elaborated further Monday in the New York Times in an article, and then in a follow up article Wednesday, both of which are likely to be much quoted and widely read. Although Premier Wen noted again in his speech Sunday that China is “worried” about the value of its US dollar reserves, perhaps as a warning that China would counteract any US trade move by selling off USG bonds, Krugman doesn’t seem especially worried about this threat.

He may be right. Aside from the fact that it is not clear how China can dump Treasury bonds, he claims that it would only help the Fed in its quantitative easing, and would probably do far more damage to Europe (since China would presumably have to buy euros) than to the US.

The latter point is almost certainly correct. China’s Selling dollars and buying something else would allow the US to get even more bang for its protectionist buck, probably at poor Europe’s expense.  I would also add that the main long-term impact of dumping USG bonds might be no more than to cause a liquidation of Chinese assets at very low prices, and an equivalent transfer of wealth from China to the US (or to others likely at some point to buy cheap dollar assets).

Remember that at the beginning of WW1 something similar happened. In an urgent attempt to raise gold reserves to pay for the war, in the late summer of 1914 European belligerents dumped onto US markets what amounted to a far greater share of US assets than China currently holds. This caused about six months of havoc, and many sleepless nights in New York and Washington. But the US responded by putting into place temporary capital and stock market controls, and when the dust settled, the net effect was one of the most massive short-term transfers of wealth ever recorded from one group of countries, the European belligerents, to another, the US.  European dumping caused a collapse in prices, and US investors ultimately scooped up the assets up very cheaply.

That doesn’t mean that there will be no cost for the US if China dumps, but rather that the cost might be absorbed fairly comfortably over a reasonable time period. I suppose I will be very unpopular for pointing this out — especially with people in the US Treasury department and among Chinese cold warriors — but please don’t blame the messenger.  I am just trying to use the limited historical precedents to figure out what is likely to happen.  We have seen asset dumping before, and on an even larger scale, and the US capital market is deep enough that it might easily absorb it.

Where I disagree with Krugman is with his claim that the chance of triggering a trade war is small. In fact, the day Krugman published his article, 130 US Congressmen sent an open letter to secretaries Timothy Geithner (Treasury) and Gary Locke (Commerce) demanding that China be designated a currency manipulator.  They called for duties to be imposed on Chinese imports to counter the effect of the undervalued RMB.  This raises pressure significantly, and I am sure in the next week or two there will be a lot more.  There are also strong rumors of some high-powered and relevant Congressional session next week.  Stay tuned.

Of course regular readers of my blog won’t be surprised by any of this.  The logic behind a prediction of trade war is almost unchallengeable, and the two countries are simply the two most visible in a world in which trade tensions must inexorably rise.  Just ask the Germans and their European partners.  Trade relationships will continue to get much worse, largely because the cost of trade war for high-deficit countries is so much lower than for high-surplus countries, and there seems to be no real attempt on either side to tone down aggressive actions or rhetoric. We seem to be caught in a downward spiral, and the longer it goes on the harder it is for anyone not to participate.

But while I think the economic effect of a tariff war on the US is likely to be smaller than many expect (and much smaller than that indicated by some of the outraged yelping I saw on a CNBC show dedicated to the subject today), and maybe even employment-positive in the short term, I do not think it is in the longer term interest of the US.  I think trade war would be very painful for China, and forcing them into such a difficult position will poison the relationship for many years.  This is likely to be the most important global relationship of the next few decades, and we really need a better way to resolve these very thorny issues, but that almost certainly isn’t going to happen.

To return to the People’s Daily article, I think many in China have argued that a revaluation of the RMB may have a significant effect on China’s trade surplus without having an equivalent effect on the US trade deficit. The same would be true of tariffs on Chinese goods.  In either case, say many in Beijing, China loses, but the US doesn’t gain, so why is the US so determined to force this outcome?

I think this claim is probably correct. An RMB revaluation in itself might not have as big an impact on the US deficit as many think. To see why, I thought I would try to outline what the impact of an RMB revaluation would be for China and the world by asking a few basic questions and coming up with my best possible answers. Here goes:

What will the balance sheet effect of an RMB revaluation be on China?

There are broadly speaking two different classes of revaluation effects, the economic effect and the balance sheet effect. By the former I just mean the impact a revaluation will have on the future development of China’s economy, and by the latter I mean the immediate balance sheet losses and gains for China. Obviously these two are related.

Let me begin with balance sheet impacts. Two weeks ago I posted a rather long entry on that very subject. For those who can’t bear reading or re-reading such a long post, the quick answer is that, contrary to common perception, a revaluation of the RMB is likely to have a very small, and probably positive, overall balance sheet impact on total Chinese wealth.

That is, however, not the end of the story. There is a significant transfer within China of wealth, which will create clear winners and losers. Basically any economic entity that is explicitly or implicitly long dollars (by which I mean any foreign currency not pegged to the RMB) and short RMB, will lose in a revaluation. Conversely, any entity that is explicitly or implicitly long RMB, and short dollars, will win. In my earlier entry I pointed out that the PBoC is the single biggest loser. It is long, if correctly counted, roughly $3 trillion in dollars, against which it is short an equivalent amount of RMB.

Exporters and manufacturers in the tradable goods sector will also lose. Their expected revenues (which can be conceptually capitalized as an asset) are mainly in dollars whereas their expected costs are partly or mainly in RMB. This means that the value of future revenues will drop relative to the value of future expenses, and so they will take a loss.

Finally in that entry I pointed out that any wealthy Chinese individual with a substantial amount of honest or ill-gotten gains stuffed in bank accounts abroad will also lose. But I forgot to mention another big group of losers — anyone in China who has stockpiled inventories of goods or commodities whose prices are set in international markets. Those prices will immediately drop in RMB terms upon a revaluation, and if the asset purchases were financed by RMB borrowing or assets, there will be a loss. So to the extent that companies or individuals are stockpiling iron, copper, chemicals, or anything similar, they will also take an immediate loss.

So who wins in a revaluation? Nearly everyone in China who has at least part of his consumption basket consisting of imported goods, which basically means every one in China except pure subsistence farmers. Because the rise in the value of the RMB causes the price of all imports automatically to fall, a revaluation increases the wealth of Chinese households by increasing the real value of their current and future assets and income.

This is the key point. A revaluation shifts wealth from the Chinese government and the manufacturing sectors (and some wealthy Chinese) to Chinese households — which, by the way, is pretty much what is meant by “rebalancing” in the Chinese context. There are many other ways besides revaluation to shift income this way. The PBoC can raise deposit rates, wages can rise faster than productivity, companies can be privatized by giving away shares to the pubic, and so on. They all have the same effect. They shift resources to households and away from producers, infrastructure investment, and real estate developers. This allows household income to grow relative to national income, which ultimately increases the consumption share of GDP.

What will the economic effect of an RMB revaluation be on China?

So as things stand currently, the reason an undervalued RMB distorts international trade is because it transfers income from Chinese households (they have to pay more for imports) and subsidizes Chinese manufacturers in the tradable goods sector. This is one of the many mechanisms by which households are forced to subsidize production and investment.

A revaluation, then, is part of the rebalancing mechanism. It helps to reduce subsidies to manufacturers and returns the income to Chinese households, who can then increase their relative consumption. But there is a cost to this rebalancing. China’s current industrial policies sacrificed household income in order to spur manufacturing growth, and this had the obvious secondary effect of speeding up employment and, with it, household income. So in a way by repressing household income growth China was paradoxically able to achieve rapid growth in household income. Neat trick, eh?

But of course this growth wasn’t unencumbered. Much Chinese growth was based on concealing the true costs behind hidden subsidies, so that real economic growth was likely to be lower than recorded economic growth. More importantly, because everything in the world must balance, the imbalances within China required the opposite imbalances outside of China — which mostly meant in the US.  Just as this global system implicitly taxed Chinese household consumption to subsidize Chinese manufacturing and employment growth, it also implicitly taxed US manufacturers in order to subsidize US consumers. American consumers got cheaper (foreign) goods, American manufacturers had to compete against lower (foreign) prices.

So Americans over-consumed and Chinese over-saved. The system worked well for quite a while, until, as with Japan in the late 1980s, US debt levels and employment rose to economically and politically unacceptable levels.

For China and the US to adjust means both of them unwinding this trade-off. Beijing will have to enact policies that reduce the subsidies to manufacturers and return the income to Chinese households. But this automatically means depressing economic growth and, more importantly, depressing employment growth.

This shouldn’t be a serious problem if it happens slowly. As Chinese manufactures gradually lose their subsidies, they will rely more than ever on the consequent rising Chinese consumption, and so domestic consumption will replace subsidized foreign demand as the source of growth. Not only will China have a safer and more balanced economy, but it will be more innovative (consumption tends to drive innovation, not production) and much more efficient.

But China cannot adjust too quickly. If Beijing removes the implicit subsidies, including those caused by the undervalued exchange rate, too rapidly, that could force large-scale bankruptcies as Chinese manufacturers found themselves unable to compete globally or at home. If these bankruptcies forced up unemployment, then paradoxically even as the transfers from households to businesses are being reversed, household income would nonetheless decline as unemployment soared. In that case Chinese manufacturers would find themselves becoming uncompetitive in international markets just as domestic markets are collapsing.

The conclusion? A rebalancing is necessary for China, as nearly everyone in the leadership knows. This will involve, among other things, a significant revaluing of the currency. But rebalancing cannot happen too quickly without risking throwing the economy into a tailspin.  That cannot and should not be a part of the US or Chinese policy objective.  By the way if China is forced to revalue the currency too quickly, it will have to enact countervailing policies — lower interest rates, suppress wages, increase credit and subsidies — to protect the economy from falling apart, and these will exacerbate other imbalances that may be even worse than the currency misalignment.  Currency revaluation, then, should be part of a broader adjustment process.

So how can the global system adjust?

If we abstract for a moment, and call all trade-deficit countries the United States, and all trade-surplus countries China, there are broadly speaking two ways the system can adjust. Remember that each domestic imbalance requires the other, so that if China adjusts, the US must adjust too, and if the US adjusts, China must adjust too.  (For those more technically inclined, by the way, this is one of the points that Krugman makes in his second article, although using different terms: China’s exporting of capital must create capital imports somewhere else, and these capital imports are the obverse of the trade deficit.)

One way in which the system can adjust is for China to take the lead and reverse the policies that cause households to transfer resources to its manufacturers. As a consequence consumption will no longer be taxed to subsidize production. This will cause household consumption to rise as share of GDP — the good way by a surge in consumption, the bad way by a collapse in economic growth.

Either way, the rebalancing in China will force an equivalent rebalancing in the US. As the price of Chinese goods rise, the net impact will be to transfer resources from US consumers, who have to pay more for their imports, to US producers (US producers become more globally competitive). The rise in Chinese consumption relative to Chinese production would be necessarily matched by a rise in US production relative to US consumption. (Some readers will notice that I am ignoring the role of investment in economic growth, and of course changes in investment matter, but over the medium to long term the basic argument is unchanged.)

The second way in which the system adjusts is if the US drives it. The US can put into place policies that favor manufacturers at the expense of consumers. These include consumption taxes, manufacturing subsidies, penalties for consumer borrowing, subsidies for investment, or, more ominously, import tariffs. These can all have the same aggregate effect on the US trade account by shifting the relationship between how much Americans produce domestically and how much they consume. And of course as the US adjusts, China must also automatically adjust.  Tariffs just on Chinese goods, by the way, will have a minimal impact on the US adjustment since trade may very well just shift to other countries.

Note that in either case both countries will rebalance, but rebalancing says nothing about how rapid economic growth must be. I addressed this in a blog entry last week when I discussed Japan’s dismal post-1990 rebalancing. In this context rebalancing just means that in China economic growth will be less than consumption growth, and in the US consumption growth will be less than economic growth. The problem is that China will try to adjust by pushing the cost of the adjustment onto the US, and the US will try to adjust by pushing the cost onto China. Each country can strive towards the good outcome (rapid economic growth) or find itself facing the bad outcome (declining consumption). This is why policy coordination and gradualism is so important.

Will a revaluation cause China’s trade surplus to decline?

Yes, all other things being equal, but of course all other things are not equal. Within China there are several things that will affect the trade surplus. Remember that the trade surplus exists because of the imbalance between Chinese domestic production and Chinese domestic consumption (technically the surplus is the difference between savings and investment), and so anything that affects the subsidies to manufacturers, or that affects household income, will also affect the trade surplus.

I have already argued that interest rates and wage growth that is lower than productivity growth can affect the trade surplus as much as the undervalued currency. In that case, if the RMB revalues, and at the same time real interest rates are forced down by a sufficient amount, or wage growth is restrained, the net result can easily be a rise, not a decline, in the trade surplus. It depends on the relative magnitude of the different factors.

The external environment also matters. If US interest rates decline for example, unlike in China where declining deposit rates is likely to spur savings, US consumption may rise even as the cost of Chinese imports rises because of a surge in the RMB.

Quite a lot of defenders of RMB stability have made the point that the rise of the yen after 1985 and the rise of the RMB after 2005 were most emphatically not associated with declining trade surpluses. According to their arguments, this clearly proves that the currency doesn’t matter.

This is nonsense, and even if it were true it seems more an argument in favor of revaluing than an argument in favor of not revaluing. But it isn’t true because in both cases there were countervailing changes.  Perhaps most importantly, local interest rates in Japan and China declined in real terms, thus reducing local consumption, and US interest rates also declined, spurring US consumption (I know, I know, this sounds strange, but the wealth effect of interest-rate changes in the US is the opposite of that in Japan and China because of the differing structures of household balance sheets). All that happened in both cases was that the rebalancing effect of the currency revaluation was swamped by the exacerbating effect of other factors. The only thing that Japan after 1985 and China after 2005 prove is that the currency is not the only thing that matters.

Will a decline in China’s trade surplus cause the US trade deficit to decline?

Not necessarily. Beijing has pointed out many times that a contraction in the Chinese trade surplus does not necessarily mean an equivalent contraction in the US trade deficit. All it requires is an equivalent contraction in the rest of the world’s net trade deficit. This could easily happen with an improvement in the trade balances of Vietnam, Mexico, Korea or anyone else, enough fully to absorb the reduction in China’s trade surplus. In that case, the US trade balance does not improve, and the US gets none of the employment benefit of the RMB revaluation. China will simply import fewer jobs from abroad and some other countries will import more, or export fewer, jobs.

Remember that if the RMB revalues, this is the same as if all the currencies of the rest of the world depreciate. This will cause a shift in the rest of the world so that households will see a small reduction in their real income, and non-Chinese producers in the tradable goods sector will see a small increase in their competitiveness vis a vis the rest of the world (largely because Chinese producers becomes less competitive). This will reduce non-Chinese consumption and increase non-Chinese production, and the distribution of these changes among different countries, including the US, will depend on a vast array of factors.

So Beijing is absolutely correct in arguing that an RMB revaluation might not have a major impact on the US trade balance, although there is one important caveat. A number of other developing countries, especially in Asia, are concerned about excessively loose domestic monetary policy and inflation, and would like to raise the values of their own currencies. They cannot do so, however, until China does. During the crisis China has expanded its share of global net demand at their expense. If an RMB revaluation causes revaluation in other countries with large trade surpluses, the net impact on the much smaller “rest of the world” will be much bigger, and so simply as a function of arithmetic the US is bound to benefit.

This fact again argues in favor of globally coordinated action rather than an excessive focus on RMB bashing. If China is forced to revalue the RMB, in order to gain the optimal global rebalancing it should be done as part of a general realignment of currencies (although of course cynics will point out that surest way to ensure that something doesn’t get done is to coordinate it globally).

Is it only China that must act?

China will rebalance, but it cannot do so quickly. If it does, as I discussed above, it may easily fall into a spiral of declining competitiveness leading to rising unemployment leading to declining domestic consumption leading to more unemployment. Clearly this is not in China’s interest.

There is another problem. There are several countries with structurally low consumption and high production — Germany, Japan and China being the most important (and I leave out the OPEC countries for obvious reasons). Simply forcing China to adjust, in that case, might cause damage to Chinese growth prospects without helping the US rebalancing effort.

For example, a sharp rise in the RMB, especially if accompanied by a rise in other Asian currencies, will take depreciation pressure off the dollar. Since currently most of that depreciation pressure is borne by the euro, a revaluation of the RMB could easily also result in a decline in the euro, whose economies will then see a sharp improvement in their net trade balance. This means that a significant part of the benefits of Chinese revaluation may accrue to Germany, a country that has yet to resolve its own internal imbalances.

So limiting the whole rebalancing discussion just to China and the RMB may end up not helping much. It is true that the US could force through a rapid domestic rebalancing of its own, including by raising import tariffs generally (and not just on Chinese goods), if it really wanted to, and the benefits to the US would be a surge in employment and manufacturing at probably little real long-term economic cost. But unilateral action on the part of the US risks creating at least some problems for the rest of the world, especially China, Japan, and parts of Europe.

So what must be done? Clearly there is a problem with the undervaluation of the RMB and with Chinese domestic imbalances. But just as clearly there are also problems with a number of other major over-consuming and over-producing countries. In addition Chinese producers have become so addicted to a wide variety of implicit subsidies, besides the currency, that they cannot possibly adjust very quickly. It will take years of continuous adjustment to wean them away from an undervalued currency, too-low interest rates, excessive credit aimed at SOEs, and sluggish wage growth.

That suggests that if we want to resolve the global imbalances in an optimal way that maximizes global growth and equity, we would need all the major problem countries to work out a program, perhaps over 8 to 10 years, in which China, Japan and Germany take concrete measures to shift subsidies away from manufacturers and return the income to households, and the US, the UK and other deficit countries shift income from households to investment.

Of course the cynic in me says getting a global solution will prove impossible. Each country that benefits in the short term from stonewalling on any aspect of the complex adjustment process will do so. So I guess that just leaves trade war. This is the year of the Tiger, after all.

More articles from China Financial Markets….

In order to produce skilled workers and experts in commodity based industries Malaysia on Wednesday launched an institute named Institute of Plantations and Commodities Malaysia (IMPAC).

Read more….

Moderately bullish on commodities as a whole for the year, Société Générale asserts that prices are likely to vary considerably from metal to metal with a strong emphasis on developing economies still a major theme.

Read more….

Zero Hedge

Submitted by Nic Lenoir of ICAP

We have been bearish on the Shanghai composite ever since the index rejected the 50-dma around 3,100. Overnight we tested and so far held the 61.8% retracement of the rally since 02/03/2010 at 2,971, and we have the support of a possible triangle formation at 2,947. Long term I remain bearish on China for reasons I will detail a bit more lower. However this potential triangle support need to be invalidated by a break to the downside. Indeed, triangles are almost exclusively continuation patterns within a trend, and in the case of an horizontal triangle it is always the case. Triangles however need 3 touch on one side and 2 on the other to be validated technically, so it is not a forgone conclusion that it is what the market is doing. This is why it is key break to the downside here, if not expect 3 months of consolidation between 3,000 and 3,240 (yawn).

I included again the chart of Copper and Copper/China PMI to show the obvious strong correlation between commodities ad China’s PMI / Growth / Equity Markets. Copper gapped lower this morning. Ideally we would have preferred to gap below 332.20 to leave the price action from March 1st to 12th as an isolated island… wishful thinking. Still, we gapped down and as I have argued several times Copper has rejected a key resistance and fundamentals are not so good with Chinese PMI rolling over and inventories quite lofty. USDCLP has consolidated after the initial spike following the retest of the former downtrend channel at 505, further appreciation is definitely tied to a break lower of both copper and Chinese equities.

In terms of fundamentals it is very interesting that so many people focus on the Yuan appreciation. I am personally rather interested in the political bickering surrounding currency float for a totally different reason: China had last year 32% YoY growth in monetary supply. All the buildings going up in China are fueled by the PBOC printing its positive trade balance every month and a flurry of lending. When it comes to lending and despite some feeble attempts to curb it, January and February have in fact shown very strong lending by Chinese state banks. If you stop for a second and imagine the consequences of China letting the Yuan float, it is rater scary. There would most likely in the current environment be an influx of dumb money into China. This would hurt their competitiveness, as well as their rationale/ability to print their positive trade balance every month. So beyond the initial influx of money, it would hurt their exports and kill their monetary growth which historically is highly correlated to the performance of their stock markets and commodities. Also the next 20 years are a fast aging one for China’s population courtesy of the one child (boy?) policy so that will add a nice deflationary headwind to the local demand. With all that factored in, I actually think the end result beyond initial speculation of a fully floating Yuan would be a very very weak Yuan. The problem is even more compounded when one considers the amount of debt piling up in China. The following article details and sums up what is going on in the land of Chinese loans better than I could or have the time t do it: http://articles.moneycentral.msn.com/Investing/JubaksJournal/is-china-actually-bankrupt.aspx?page=1

This is why a slowly appreciating Yuan is the only possible path for the PBOC, but as always when you artificially build and foster imbalances there is a flip side… You will run into inflation problems and hiking rates on this huge pile of loans may not be a pleasant experience. The only real question is when the end game is, but I think overall this shows why China is pretty much bound to experience a very hard landing: 1929-style, or Zimbabwe- and then 1929-style is only a question of form but not end result.

Waiting for the big picture to kick in, it is probably worth taking partial profits on SHCOMP shorts, and add back on if we break 2,947/2,971. Long term preference is the downside, but we need a short-term technical validation for the momentum to build up now.

Good luck trading,

Nic  

More articles from Zero Hedge….

Journey to the Center of the Earth

Miles below the ocean floor lies enough oil to power the U.S. for more than a decade—and perhaps our best shot at energy independence.

From the window of a helicopter 1,500 feet above the Gulf of Mexico, oil platforms look like Tinkertoys in a swimming pool. Dozens dot the horizon stretching south from New Orleans and continuing out as the water deepens and turns a darker blue. Then, about 50 miles offshore, the platforms stop, and for the next hundred miles there’s nothing. This is the deepwater Gulf of Mexico, where the ocean floor is 8,000 feet down and covered in a heavy layer of muck. Below that is an ancient salt bed several miles thick, and hidden under that, trapped tens of thousands of feet down, there’s oil—billions and billions of barrels of it. And it’s all in U.S. waters.

ANALYSIS – Finding deepwater oil proves tough slog for Mexico

MEXICO CITY (Reuters) – Mexico’s state oil company Pemex is learning the hard way why U.S. oilmen frustrated by failed multimillion dollar wells once dismissed the deep waters of the Gulf of Mexico as “the Dead Sea.”

The government says 29.5 billion barrels of oil equivalent could lie beneath the seabed in Mexico’s part of the Gulf deep waters. But seven years after Pemex started to drill, the the company has little to show for its efforts.

Exxon Mobil to proceed with LNG project

Exxon Mobil Corporation says it will proceed with a multi-billion dollar liquefied natural gas (LNG) project in Papua New Guinea.

Sales and purchase agreements with LNG buyers, and financing arrangements with lenders, have been completed, the company said on Saturday.

Saudi, Conoco extend refinery bids deadline-sources

KHOBAR, Saudi Arabia (Reuters) – Saudi Aramco and U.S. firm ConocoPhillips have again extended the deadline for bids for a solids handling unit at their Yanbu refinery joint venture, industry sources said on Saturday.

The deadline is now June 1 for bids on the construction of the unit at the 400,000 barrels per day (bpd) refinery, two sources close to the bidding process said.

Venezuela draws up plan to assure food distribution if energy crisis worsens

CARACAS, Venezuela (AP) – The Venezuelan government and food producers have outlined a plan to guarantee the distribution of food if the South American nation’s energy crisis worsens, an industry official said Friday.

Venezuelan Pork Federation president Alberto Cudemus said government and private-sector representatives met the previous evening on how to insulate the food sector from power outages. He said the plan involves reducing water use and investing to make food producers self-sufficient in energy within 90 to 360 days.

How long it takes will hinge on both the private sector’s willingness to make the investments, and the government facilitating permits to import electrical generators and giving access to foreign currency to purchase the equipment, Cudemus said.

“We are sort of racing against the clock in the food sector and do not want to let the country down,” he added.

Rising energy costs fuel a return to heating residences with a fire

Soaring energy prices are rekindling Britain’s love affair with the warm glow of a open fire. Householders are ripping out gas devices and installing wood burners or opening chimneys to make a traditional blaze with coal.

Sales of wood burners are increasing by 40 per cent a year, says the Solid Fuel Association, which represents the industry.

To solve our energy crisis, look to the sea

“Spirit of Ireland”, the impressive volunteer think-tank for energy independence, aims to find empty west-coast valleys to dam and flood with seawater – pumped storage for reserve hydropower linked to adjoining wind-farms. In a similar “Turlough Hill” approach, the Organic Power company would use surplus wind-power to pump seawater up to reservoirs on Glinsk Mountain, above the cliffs of North Mayo. This will feed generating turbines, when needed, as it pours back down a shaft to the ocean.

In the crisis over climate change and energy, attention comes back to nature – even to the rocks the island is made of, and the seabed all around it. There is news of Ireland’s first geothermal energy project, using the heat in deep rock strata hugging the mantle of the Earth. It will bore down to layers four kilometres deep under Newcastle, Co Dublin, and harness their heat, through a water network, to warm half the city.

Out of the endless sprawl

Conservatism itself is rooted more in the community and especially in the fertile soil of tradition than in the individual. In a land of strip malls and ten-lane freeways, of rampant materialism and unending competition, tradition and community become irrelevant – become skeletal ghosts on display behind panes of glass. Anymore, the American right views its historical patrons – Burke, Oakeshott, et alia – as somewhat quaint figures, whose philosophy should be cherry-picked for all the ripest talking-points.

Chris Martenson: Getting the story right

When I had the chance at the UK Parliament talk, I gave one “solution” (more of a ‘response’, really, but people like the word solution) – I proposed that we create a national or even international organization to study net energy and energy flows. It should be extremely well-funded and attract our best and brightest, so that we can answer such simple questions as, “Should we retroactively insulate existing structures, or should we build a new light rail system?” Because we only know the economics of that question, we can’t answer the most important question of all: “Which offers the higher energy returned on energy invested?”

Made in the U.S.A.: Efficiency Materials

While solar and wind manufacturers struggle to fend off Chinese competition, energy efficiency equipment seems to have no such problem.

According to a recent study commissioned by efficiency advocates, equipment like caulking and insulation — basic tools for retrofitting the country’s homes and businesses — is almost entirely made in the United States.

…Matt Golden, the chairman of Efficiency First, said he was surprised that the numbers were so high for caulking, but insulation was easier to explain.

“You don’t want to make it in China, because a container full of insulation costs so little it’s not worth shipping,” Mr. Golden said.

Crude Oil Falls as U.S. Consumer Sentiment Unexpectedly Drops

(Bloomberg) — Crude oil declined for the first time in three days after a report showed that confidence among U.S. consumers unexpectedly dropped this month.

Oil fell 1.1 percent as the Reuters/University of Michigan preliminary consumer sentiment index dropped to 72.5 from February’s reading of 73.6. A gain to 74 was forecast, according to the median of 68 estimates in a Bloomberg News survey. Prearranged orders to sell oil at specific prices, known as stops, may have been triggered as oil declined.

Conoco Proposes Spending $13 Billion on Norway Fields

(Bloomberg) — ConocoPhillips, the third-largest U.S. oil company, proposed development plans for the North Sea Eldfisk and Ekofisk South fields offshore Norway valued at as much as $13 billion to prolong their production lives.

Déjà vu: Energy Prices

It’s hard to believe it’s been two years this month since this column first revealed that speculators were running riot in the oil futures market. I pointed out that unrestrained commodities speculators were causing the oil price climb we were seeing, which would send the cost of crude to a peak of $147 a barrel by the summer of 2008. At the time most “experts” quoted in the media were saying that oil prices were skyrocketing because world supplies couldn’t keep up with demand, or because we had passed the point of Peak Oil. Neither position was true, of course; just looking at tanker shipments and worldwide oil supplies on hand, those concepts were obviously invalid.

Pakistan’s War on Terror and the New Cold War

A new Cold war is in beginning. This time centre of this cold war is not Europe but South Central and Euro- Asia. Keeping in mind peak oil and conflicting interests of dominant powers, probability of return of cold war is a logical conclusion.

At Strategic level we see shift in policies of all concerned powers in Afghanistan and Central Asia. US Policy has at last tilted in Pakistan’s Favor and India is on retreat. Pakistan and US are coordinating with each other against extremism and results are coming both in Afghanistan and Pakistan.

China looks to ‘combustible ice’ as a fuel source

(PhysOrg.com) — Buried below the tundra of China’s Qinghai-Tibet Plateau is a type of frozen natural gas containing methane and ice crystals that could supply energy to China for 90 years. China discovered the large reserve of methane hydrate last September, and last week the Qinghai Province announced that it plans to allow researchers and energy companies to tap the energy source. Although methane hydrate is plentiful throughout the world, the key challenge for China and other nations will be to develop technologies to excavate the fuel without damaging the environment.

Process could clean up water used in natural gas drilling

(PhysOrg.com) — Texas A&M Engineering is playing a role in a technological breakthrough that could clean up the contaminated water recovered from drilling natural gas wells in shale deposits through the process of “hydraulic fracturing.”

David Burnett of Texas A&M’s Global Petroleum Research Institute — in partnership with the Texas Engineering Extension Service (TEEX) and Carl Vavra of the TEES Food Protein R&D Center Separation Sciences Laboratory, developed the membrane filtration technology — which has been licensed to a major oil field service company for commercialization.

Coal brings Wyoming, Queensland together

CHEYENNE — Though they are on opposite sides of the world, Wyoming and Queensland, Australia, have something in common.

Coal.

And both states have critical economic interests in keeping coal saleable despite climate-change concerns.

Is Creating Green Jobs a “Sensible Aspiration” for Governments?

That’s the topic of an ongoing online debate over at the Economist.com. In one corner, green jobs advocate Van Jones, who argues that governments should engage in the active practice of creating green jobs, by, for example, incentivizing clean energy projects. In the other, Andrew P. Morriss, a professor of business and law at the University of Illinois, who argues that green job creation should be left to the marketplace.

It’s a fascinating debate, and one that needs to be had. After all, Spain solar power industry just underwent a painful collapse due to miscalculated subsidies, and policy ideas for green job generation are being considered at this very moment in the US Senate.

Slick, slim rail design to unclog city routes

(PhysOrg.com) — A driverless, electric-powered light rail system designed to whisk commuters more efficiently around central Auckland (New Zealand) and across the harbour bridge could appeal to people who snub existing public transport, says its creator.

The New Road to Energy Sustainability

Dear Congress,

We, the American People, want a New Deal for energy.

We’re tired of watching the rest of the world kick the clean energy industry into high gear while we’re still stuck in neutral, debating a weak cap-and-trade bill that doesn’t come close to meeting our energy challenge.

Lexicon of Change: The Rise of Transition Culture

You may or may not have heard of the Transition movement — described by its founder, Rob Hopkins, as “an exercise in engaged optimism”— yet Transition’s ideas are informing and even guiding the conversation of how communities confront the twin crises of peak oil and climate change.

The movement is driven by one simple idea: Rather than hand-wringing and lamenting dwindling energy reserves and climate change, Transition wants people to envision and create models for that future — and find much to be cheerful about.

Board Extends Deadline for Everglades Land Deal

OKEECHOBEE, Fla. — Facing legal challenges and growing deficits, South Florida water officials on Thursday gave themselves six more months to finance a controversial $536 million purchase of land from United States Sugar for the Everglades.

The unanimous vote by the nine-member board of the South Florida Water Management District will keep the deal alive, but officials said they continued to struggle with whether the agency could afford it.

Is nuclear necessary? Duke study touts power of renewables

How necessary is nuclear power? Renewable energy, including solar, wind and hydroelectric, can provide all but 6% of North Carolina’s electricity, finds a new Duke University study.

NRG Says Texas Power Agreements Are ‘Stumbling Block’ for Solar

(Bloomberg) — NRG Energy Inc. said the power- purchase agreements in Texas, which appropriate money one year at a time rather than several years, are a “stumbling block” to developing solar electricity plants in the state.

Wind resistance: Analysis suggests generating electricity from large-scale wind farms could influence climate

In a paper published online Feb. 22 in Atmospheric Chemistry and Physics, Wang and Prinn suggest that using wind turbines to meet 10 percent of global energy demand in 2100 could cause temperatures to rise by one degree Celsius in the regions on land where the wind farms are installed, including a smaller increase in areas beyond those regions. Their analysis indicates the opposite result for wind turbines installed in water: a drop in temperatures by one degree Celsius over those regions. The researchers also suggest that the intermittency of wind power could require significant and costly backup options, such as natural gas-fired power plants.

Aquatic ‘dead zones’ contributing to climate change

“As the volume of hypoxic waters move towards the sea surface and expands along our coasts, their ability to produce the greenhouse gas nitrous oxide increases,” explains Dr. Codispoti of the UMCES Horn Point Laboratory. “With low-oxygen waters currently producing about half of the ocean’s net nitrous oxide, we could see an additional significant atmospheric increase if these ‘dead zones’ continue to expand.”

Report: The Case for Global Warming Stronger Than Ever

One of the many crimes that climate scientists have been accused of lately is that they claim absolute certainty in a field of research fraught with uncertainty. Sure, the planet is warming, say skeptics, but that’s happened throughout Earth’s history, long before humans were burning fossil fuels. So, how can we be sure this isn’t just a natural phenomenon?

On Friday in an unprecedented move with the USDA, the Department of Justice will launch an investigation into the farm business. The investigation begins a 7-state probe into how Monsanto treats its customers, our nation’s farmers.

I recently had the honor of presenting for our nation’s top producing farmers in Chicago at the Top Producer Seminar, sponsored by Cargill and Pioneer. I was scheduled to present with Monsanto’s VP of Sustainable Yield, but a few days before the presentation was told that he had moved to China and that there was no one to take his place. I then had the privilege of spending the afternoon in an incredibly insightful discussion with the farmers, many of whom are Monsanto’s customers, who are remarkable fathers, grandfathers, and businessmen.

As I walked into the room for that presentation, I was greeted with “Welcome to the Lions’ Den.” As I found the courage to take the stage, I shared that according to the USDA, farm income was down 35% in 2009. I then shared that Monsanto is reporting, in forward looking statements to Wall Street analysts based on projected sales that they have asked for from the farmers, that Monsanto is expecting gross margins in Q2 2010 of 62% and that they are expecting to drive up the price mix of their products, corn and soy, by 8-10%. I also shared that according to these forward looking statements, Monsanto expects to expand their glyphosate revenue to an estimated $1 billion in gross profit by 2012, further enabling Monsanto to drive R&D into seeds and to price those seeds at a premium – further driving price increases on the farm.

And then I listened.

What I learned from these remarkable men and women is simply jaw dropping.

Due to Monsanto’s contracts with seed companies, farmers are now bound by the threat of a lawsuit if they speak out regarding farm practices. As third and fourth generation farmers, inheriting their grandfathers’ lands, their corn crops are no longer regulated by the FDA but by the EPA due to the insecticidal proteins they now contain, and they are subject to rising, unregulated costs never before seen in farming – contractual fees, trait fees, licensing fees and royalty fees and germ plasm fees associated with a technology that has been engineered into seeds designed to enhance Monsanto’s bottom line.

As I listened to the farmers and learned about their trade practices, I could not help but think of AT&T and the Bell System which for years functioned as a regulated monopoly until an antitrust investigation resulted in its break-up, as the practices employed by Monsanto on the farm, rival the fee structure that the phone company once had in place.

As our dialogue grew, we learned that together, we could affect remarkable change.

So in collaboration with our nation’s leading farmers to address the patents, licenses and royalties fees now being engineered into our food supply designed to enhance the profitability of the world’s largest agrichemical corporation , here are 8 steps that the USDA and the Department of Justice could take to address the financial impact that these practices are having on the farm:

1. As was done with AT&T, re-establish Monsanto and its subsidiaries into separate companies; separating the germ plasm and technology divisions into independent entities
2. Establish precedence that these newly established entities do not collect trait fees, royalty fees, licensing fees or other forms of income from each other, then they should not be allowed to collect these tech fees from the independent companies
3. Have Monsanto refund the money collected from the independent seed companies as retribution for the fact that the same fees were not charged to their partners and subsidiaries.
4. Require that all companies (Monsanto, DuPont, Syngenta etc.) supply genetically treated and untreated seeds and technology to the public in order to give the farmers a free market from which to choose how much the farmer wants to spend on a bag of corn or beans given that the current practice involves the blending of the best genetics into melting stock corns, so the companies can harvest more profit.
5. Establish an oversight committee with one term limits made up of independent seed companies and with multi nationals in an effort to prevent monopolistic price increases in the cost of corn and soy production that will impact food price inflation at the retail level.
6. Structure federal subsidies so that taxpayer dollars are used to subsidize and provide marketing and insurance programs for the growth of commodities (corn and soybean crops) that are grown without the use of synthetically engineered chemical ingredients
7. Reduce the fees charged to farmers growing crops without synthetic, chemical and genetically engineered ingredients that they must pay in order to certify that their crops are free of these ingredients (fees are paid to certifiers, not to the USDA National Organic Program).
8. Provide the same level of marketing assistance and crop insurance programs to farmers growing crops free of synthetic and chemical ingredients.

In a world in which food security is as much of an issue as nutrition, the establishment of a level playing field on the farm is vital to the health of our food system. And while the lack of federal oversight and regulation of trade practices on the farm has enhanced Monsanto’s profitability drivng shareholder value, its costs are being externalized not only onto our nation’s farmers but also onto the 300 million American eaters.

We are all stakeholders in our food supply and together, we can affect remarkable change for farmers, families and food.

Read more….

By Charles Hugh Smith, OFTWOMINDS
Since virtually all asset classes rose together, why can’t they all fall together, too?

Go to my main site at www.oftwominds.com/blog.html
for the full posts and archives.

More articles from Charles Hugh Smith….

The Daily Reckoning

Since we have little interest in joining the speculative party going on in the stock market at the moment – other than in the precious metals and “positive black swan” type of stocks we mentioned yesterday – the task of today’s Daily Reckoning is to prove why the coming collapse of the shadow banking system is not deflationary by inflationary and, among other things, bullish for gold.

If that’s not the sort of discussion that interests you, you might want to go take a powder or read a good book. These are murky waters we’re wading through. So we’ll do our best to clear them up for you. But it’s probably going to take two days. Today, we’ll look at the case against deflation. Tomorrow, we’ll look at what it means for Australia.

All good debates begin with a proper definition of terms. Rather than defining deflation in our own way, we’ll leave it up to one of its most consistent and articulate (and accurate) advocates, Robert Prechter. He’s written about it for years. But for a short course on what he’s predicting and why, check out this video.

In the video Prechter says, “The next big phase [in the cycle] is a credit implosion where people who are debtors are going to be scrambling for dollars to pay off their debts and the creditors are going to be dunning the debtors to pay them back….The scramble will be for dollars not for things.”

The investment outcome of Prechter’s scenario is bullish for the U.S. dollar and U.S. Treasury bills, where he says, “the chances of default are low.” Prechter’s argument is based on the idea – which we happen to believe – that the U.S. Federal Reserve is unable to prevent falling asset values. This would lead, by Prechter’s reckoning, to falling stock, commodity, and real estate values.

All of that seems right to us so far. The deflationary argument depends on the collapse of both the shadow AND the real (deposit taking) banking system. The shadow banking system is the murky world of credit, securitisation, and derivatives which currently supports and/or holds some $600 trillion in assets. Yes that’s trillion with a T.

Most of these are interest rate and credit derivatives. As we learned in the last two years, the big risk here is to institutions which owe and own these obligations amongst one another. In our view, the degree of interconnectedness among these obligations (they still aren’t unwound) still makes the entire global financial system vulnerable to a systemic shock and/or total collapse.

It nearly happened last time with Lehman and frankly not much has changed since. A good old interest rate spike that’s not in anyone’s model might be the sort of thing that precipitates the next crisis. After all, that’s the way these things generally begin.

You could make the argument that it shouldn’t really matter to the real economy if a bunch of global institutions find out they can’t settle their obligations to one another. Why not just forget the whole mess and start other? After all, most of these derivatives are just insurance policies of some sort. Can’t we just cancel the policy?

Probably not. These positions are held in conjunction with myriad leveraged bets on the direction of other asset prices. They are hedges. No one is going to walk away from them. But more importantly, the connection between the shadow banking system and the real banking system is much more substantial than you might first imagine.

So much of today’s funding, financing, and lending is done by the shadow banking system through securitisation and money markets and income and mortgage trusts. The real economy is tied to the shadow banking system in just the way that you are tied to your own shadow. And the real, deposit taking, depostior (taxpayer)-insured banking system is not much better off.

For example, my colleague Porter Stansberry reported today that in the U.S., 7.1% of commercial real estate loans are more than 90 days overdue. The FDIC reckons that over 700 U.S. regional and local banks are “danger” banks. The reason is that these banks own mostly commercial real estate. It’s their main asset. And unlike their money-centre big brothers on Wall Street, these banks aren’t going to be recapitalised or bailed out at taxpayer expense.

Students of the Great Depression will know that widespread bank failures led to a contraction in the money supply. Banks, more than the central bank, are the engine of money and credit growth in a fiat money system. Take away several hundred banks, and you get lenders not making loans. Money supply shrinks. Cash and Treasuries gain in value.

In fact, when you couple the wounded regional banks in the U.S., who are massively exposed to one dangerous asset class, with the potential collapse of the shadow banking system from another interest rate/liquidity/solvency shock, you begin to wonder how deflation is avoidable at all in the near future.

We have a laboured three-part answer. We’re going to lay it on you now. It begins with the destruction of the shadow banking system. It accelerates with the paralysis of the regular banking system. And it concludes with deliberate devaluation of the currency via monetary and fiscal policy to make up for a completely destroyed credit system.

It’s easier than it sounds.

Granted, it probably sounds absurd that you can have a $600 trillion wipe-out in the shadow banking system and have inflation. But there are two points to make here. First, it’s hardly believable that an institutional panic and bank run in the shadow banking system (what happened last time) would actually boost confidence by individuals and consumers in the overall banking system.

True, it might increase people’s preference for liquidity and cash. Stocks, real estate, and bonds would fall. But another swift collapse in the shadow banking system would be a hammer blow to already fragile confidence in our financial system, including the value of paper money itself.

But a more technical response is that as the shadow banking system is unable to finance economic activity and speculation, either that activity goes away (a Greater Depression) or someone else tries to fill the gap. We’ll assume for the moment the regular banks won’t do it. That leaves the government.

And in fact, that is what you had in the U.S. following the last crisis. You got an alphabet soup of Fed-backed programs to provide all sorts of credit…to students, to money markets, to car companies, to corporations. This list grows longer by the day. And what it means is that the only provider of credit in a post-shadow banking world is the public sector: the Fed and the Treasury.

Whether these are loan guarantees or outright loans or the purchase of securitised mortgages (Fannie and Freddie) it amounts to the same thing: a huge transfer and burden to the public sector balance sheet. Whether it’s monetisation or guarantees that add to Federal liabilities, both are dollar bearish. The transfer to the public sector then, results both in destruction of asset values and inflation in the currency.

But wait! You can’t have inflation if there’s no one to make loans and use the money multiplier to turn growth in the monetary base into new Federal Reserve Notes. That is, if the shadow banking system collapses, won’t this lead to the same no-risk paralysis with the big banks that has led to their holding trillions of dollars in excess reserves with Central Banks?

Why yes, it will. But this also argues for inflation. Here we’re going out on a limb. But what we’re arguing is that as the private sector is less able or willing to dole out credit into the economy, we’re entering a world where the government is going to bypass the middleman and do the job itself.

This happens in three ways. First, the government can buy securitised assets to fund non-bank lenders. The AOFM does this in Australia to support housing prices and non-bank lending to first home buyers. It’s done in the State at a much more comprehensive level. In effect, the entire American mortgage market has been nationalised with the government guaranteeing and buying trillions in mortgages.

This is the future. More nationalisation of key lending institutions. If the private sector won’t do it, the Feds will. But at great cost. Each new loan guarantee weakens the public balance sheet and the currency. Thus the retreat of the banks from credit creation hastens the day where fiscal and monetary policy are forced to be more transparently absurd and redistributive.

The second way in which the government becomes a lender is through extended unemployment benefits. The dole. In some States, it’s possible to receive 99 weeks of unemployment benefits. This doesn’t mean dole bludging has become a full time job. But it does mean that the structural changes to Western labour markets wreaked by globalisation are wage deflationary.

To us, this means a larger regular expenditure on the unemployed. The U.S. is headed the way of Europe, with higher structural unemployment. Whether it can afford to pay for this while fighting two wars, spending a $1 trillion expanding health care coverage, and preparing for an increase in entitlement payments…well you do the math.

The net result of the increased burden on the public sector in supporting private incomes is a weaker currency. It always comes back to that. And it’s true for the Euro, the Yen, and the Dollar. It’s true, in fact, for all paper money. This is why we believe the end of the super cycle in paper money is bullish for precious metals (not deflationary).

The third way in which the government bypasses the traditional banking sector to get money into the hot little hands of consumers has already been suggested by Ben Bernanke: via helicopter. And this really is the greatest argument against the deflationary theory.

In one sense, Bernanke was right. The Fed can create an infinite amount of digital dollars. It can expand its balance sheet infinitely too. It can buy assets directly. It can buy gold mines. It can probably create a market that securitises future consumer wages and pays you now for them. You literally mortgage your wage-earning future (or perhaps you get an early pay out on your social security).

The only real restrictions on the Fed’s ability to create money are rising bond yields (market discipline on currency mismanagement) and political interference. On the first issue, the Fed has some covering fire. Global investors have to own something. And right now they prefer the dollar. Unless the Fed does something radical and reckless, it can expand its role in providing credit directly to the real economy without doing huge damage to the dollar…mostly because there are so few other good options.

Obviously we think gold is a good option. But for nations like China with trillions locked up in dollar-denominated assets, what options are there?

You could argue that the U.S. Congress and the President would not allow the wilful debasement of the currency via an expanded Fed role in direct lending. But we think just the opposite. Those ass-clowns will be begging for it.

When commercial real estate blows up regional banks, we predict you’ll see the President declare victory in Iraq and Afghanistan within months, bring the boys home, and cut defence spending by 30%. The money will pour into new lending and “jobs” programs to support the economy. Fiscal and monetary policy will work hand in glove to pump funny government money directly into the consumer economy. The only result there can be is hyperinflation.

So, it’s possible – likely even – that you’re going to see across the board falls in stocks, real estate, bonds, and commodities….AND inflation. Whether we got the proper sequence right, we’re not sure. But the combination of a shattered shadow banking system, a paralysed banking system, and a terrified government certainly do add up to massive inflation.

Tomorrow, is this just an American tragedy? Or is Australia at risk too? And quite obviously, what should you do?

Dan Denning
for The Daily Reckoning Australia

Similar Posts:

• Credit Markets Threaten Retail Banking, Bank Runs Next?
• Nationalised Banking System Will Come from Global Market Rout
• Bankers Take Money From the Government and Use it to Speculate
• The Single Best Trade for 2010
• World Economy Faces Hyperinflation or Deflation?

More articles from The Daily Reckoning….